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U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations

Public Diplomacy Programs

4 February 2004

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Witness testimony ...

Excerpts of testimony

Margaret Tutwiler, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

We need to continue to focus on those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our nation and, at the same time, work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, 'Is this activity or program still effective in today’s world?' If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own personnel overseas. We will shortly be able to communicate and share new ideas amongst ourselves and across all regions through a new interactive website.

I believe we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. Our senior officials, Ambassadors and embassy staff are out there explaining U.S. policy, goals and initiatives. However, we can all do better.

Full text

Ambassador Edward Djerejian

The bottom has indeed fallen out of support for the United States. In Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, only 15 percent view the United States favorably, compared with 61 percent in early 2002. In Saudi Arabia, according to a Gallup poll, only 7 percent had a "very favorable" view of the U.S. while 49 percent had a "very unfavorable" view. In Turkey, a secular Muslim, non-Arab democracy that is a stalwart member of NATO and a longtime supporter of America, favorable opinion toward the U.S. dropped from 52 percent three years ago to 15 percent in the spring of 2003, according to the Pew Research Center. The problem is not limited to the Arab and Muslim world. In Spain, an ally in the war in Iraq, 3 percent had a "very favorable" view of the United States while 39 percent had a "very unfavorable" view.

America's position as, by far, the world's preeminent power may well contribute to the animosity, but it is not a satisfying explanation. The United States enjoyed the same level of relative power after World War II, for example, but was widely admired throughout the world. Arab and Muslim nations are a primary source of anger toward the United States, although such negative attitudes are paralleled in Europe and elsewhere.

Since September 11, 2001, the stakes have been raised. Attitudes toward the United States were important in the past, but now they have become a central national security concern. Although the objective of foreign policy is to promote our national interests and not, specifically, to inspire affection, hostility toward the United States makes achieving our policy goals far more difficult. The Defense Science Board reported nearly two years ago that effective " information dissemination capabilities are powerful assets vital to national security. They can create diplomatic opportunities, lessen tensions that might lead to war, contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to America's interests." Achieving our interests is far easier if we do not have to buck a tide of anti-Americanism in addition to considered policy opposition.

Today's public diplomacy has proven inadequate to the task. The creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) 50 years ago, at the height of the Cold War, was a recognition that traditional state-to-state diplomacy alone could not achieve U.S. interests in a world of fast communications and sophisticated propaganda. Government is only one player among many trying to influence the opinions of people in other countries, and state-to-state diplomacy alone will not improve negative attitudes of citizens. Part of this inadequacy is the result of a lack of proper resources, both human and financial, but much of it is the result of insufficient strategic coordination at the top and a management structure that lacks flexibility and limits accountability.

Full text

Ambassador David Abshire

I think part of the problem is the term 'public diplomacy,' which implies something carried out by diplomats and does not adequately signify the strategic role global communications play in advancing and maintaining our national security. Our public diplomacy strategy must be recognized as equal in importance to our military and diplomatic strategies. President Eisenhower, the only five star general to become President, was a true grand strategist when he created USIA and announced that the battle of ideas was the ultimate contest. Similarly, the commanding general of the 101st Airborne in Iraq said recently, 'You don’t defeat an insurgency solely with military forces. You win by getting the people to believe they have a stake in the success of the new Iraq.'

Yet we have neither integrated public diplomacy into our foreign policy formulation nor provided the resources needed to have a truly effective global communications strategy. The classic military strategist Napoleon believed that the battle of perceptions was ultimately three times more important than his armies. By contrast, the amount we spent last year on efforts to change minds and attitudes abroad (including the Middle East Partnership Initiative to promote free societies in the region) was only three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) of our defense budget. To turn the tide in the struggle of ideas, we must close the resource gap that handicaps our public diplomacy and fully incorporate global communications into our national security strategy.

Let me emphasize that my criticism of our failure to meet the global communications challenge is not meant to denigrate the efforts of the State Department, the BBG, and other agencies, which have initiated innovative efforts such as the American Corners program, Radio Sawa, and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. But we must greatly strengthen the strategic focus and coordination of our public diplomacy while more effectively marshalling the creativity of America’s private sector, the world leader in the communication revolution and entertainment business.

Full text

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