Making Public Diplomacy Effective
State Department Public Diplomacy Must Be Realigned
Updated 15 November 2004
If you care about the future of U.S. public diplomacy, join us at the USIA Alumni Association
Summary
Public Diplomacy (PD), a key instrument of foreign policy, can promote a favorable climate of public opinion in important countries if it is credible, flexible, adequately resourced, and proactive. Today, in part due to its configuration within State, it is far from being an effective instrument of foreign affairs. Some field initiatives are acted upon by Washington PD components but others may languish or depend on the "old boy network" for response. Reallocation of resources is slow or not acted upon.
Communication with country audiences, both field-driven and Washington-driven, must be supported by a Washington process that is clearly defined and responsive, providing up-and-down linkage to the field from Under Secretary for PD & PA (R) to the PAOs and involving International Information Programs (IIP) and Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) if indicated. Both recent Under Secretries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) have been critically restricted by the current PD organization arrangement.
PD policy control and input should remain in the regional bureaus and be responsive to bureau requirements while overseeing policy application to PD activities. Recognizing this, the recommended realignment includes establishing an A/S for Field PD-Coordinator along with adequate geographic, executive, administrative staffs.
This position would answer to "R" and coordinate the PD process. A new geographic staff would possess country expertise and advise on and support to all programming - what will work, cultural barriers, etc. The "nuts and bolts" of PD program support would fall to these new "desk" officers removing this responsibility from the regional bureaus. Some of the geographic officers would be transferred from the PD components of the regional bureaus whereas one or more senior PD officers would remain to provide policy coordination and input in their bureaus. "R" through the new A/S should have input into PD training and assignments. PAO evaluations, now done by chiefs of missions should have inputs by the new A/S and the PD in the regional bureaus.
End Summary
Public Diplomacy: A powerful instrument for American foreign policy
Public Diplomacy (PD), appropriately funded and pulsed by a synergy of components directed by professional PD officers, can be a powerful and important instrument in gaining understanding if not support for America's foreign policy objectives.
To be effective, PD should be proactive, nimble, and flexible with its resources. It must avoid getting mired in a hierarchical, reactive environment while driven by foreign policy objectives. PD leadership must be acutely tuned to and supportive of PD initiatives, both field and Washington and provide overall guidance, direction and resource support. The core philosophy of effective PD is based on communication dialogue (emphasis on dialogue, not monologue) with key audiences. Listening and learning (in the local language) followed by convincing discussion with opinion leaders are essential. The climate of public opinion can only be influenced if the PD conveyors in the field have achieved credibility in their dealings with key opinion leaders.
Field posts are directed by the US ambassadors while supplied with policy guidance from Washington. To be successful, support from Washington for field initiatives must be rapid and coordinated with PD components in the Department. All PD officers in the field and in Washington should have a clear understanding of which Washington offices and officers are responsible to coordinate each field initiative. All must have an open channel to the top PD leadership in the Department. Geographic and country expertise must be instantly available to advise PD leadership which initiatives will work and won't work and to make program recommendations. Resources and budget re-allocations must become more flexible and faster in application.
Self-imposed conditions restrict successful PD
Funding and outreach.
Funding and outreach of PD field programs severely limit effectiveness of our PD efforts around the world and especially in the crucial geographic areas spotlighted in the aftermath of 9/11. Shortage of resources to re-open libraries, branch posts, pursue other outreach programs and to restore appropriate country levels of PD personnel within our embassies are crippling. Even if budgets and PD personnel are significantly increased, there is wide recognition that the machinery of our current PD operations within the State Department is crippled and requires realignment. President Bush as well as Congressional leaders have asked, "Why are our messages not convincing?"
At the center of this problem is the way the PD process is organized within State. Much PD potential is unnecessarily limited by the current Department PD organization.
Foreign policy.
Assistant secretaries in the regional bureaus should and must control policy of all elements in their areas, PD included. This is a given. PD activities both in Washington and the field lead from this policy and should be positioned to contribute to policy creation and application. When USIA was merged into State, it was expected that by placing the former "Area Offices" of USIA into the regional bureaus, policy and geographic expertise would meld into efficient support for field initiatives and strengthen Washington-driven PD policy initiatives. Unfortunately, this expectation did not materialize well, even after four years of effort and experience.
Congress assigned overall PD responsibility to a new position, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs "R". However, this mandate did not also provide corresponding specific authority to manage PD within the Department and the field operations. So limited, "R" cannot currently resolve the obstacles to effective PD which include (a) top-to-bottom linkage and (b) "authority" to support that responsibility.
A misfunctioning organization, point-by-point
Chart 1, Current public diplomacy organization in Department of State
PD field initiatives are sent to the Department for support and program guidance. Frequently, the communications end up in the regional bureaus and may or may not be assigned to the PD officers in those bureaus for action. Sometimes those field requests are lost in the bureaucracy. Other times those field requests are specifically assigned to the PD officers within the regional bureaus who work to support them but must resort to the "old boy network" of former USIA colleagues in other PD components to fulfill them as there is no spelled-out mechanism for the process. Dealings with the PD field posts by regional PD officers are often "ad hoc". There are sometimes confusion and frustration by PD officers in the field and in the regional bureaus due to vague lines of responsibility and realization from past experience that a more efficient and workable process should be doable in State. Bottom line - PD effectiveness suffers.
At the same time, PD officers in the regional bureaus do not control field programs (although they provide resources) and have little authority over the PD officers in the field. Linkage coupled with authority is not there.
Field PD officers have no defined and direct linkage to "R" who is, on paper, their director. In reality they must deal and negotiate with the PD officers in the regional bureaus, the International Information Programs (IIP), the Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and other Department components. There is no coordinator for PD field programs.
"R's" position as Under Secretary precludes this officer from having a geographic staff to advise what PD efforts will work and not work and to provide program suggestions. Nor does s/he have the support of executive and administrative staffs to control all PD resources with flexibility and to move them where needed even though "R" has been assigned PD "earmarks" for budget allocations by the Congress. A fast-moving PD activity must be able to reallocate resources rapidly which is not doable at present.
Department hierarchy dictates that only assistant secretaries can control programs, most of the resources and be operational. Currently the geographic expertise "R" so obviously needs is within the regional bureaus and is not immediately responsive. . Missing also is direct linkage to field operations. Efficient use of the PD instrument is sharply curtailed if "R" does not have the authority and direct linkage to support and guide PD programs worldwide as is now the case.
Foreign policy control of PD operations must be continued by the regional assistant secretaries and their bureaus. PD officers within those bureaus should advise and provide input into policy creation and execution. At the same time a realignment of the PD structure under the Under Secretary (R) is required.
Chart 2, Proposed public diplomacy organization
A. Establish an Assistant Secretary - (Coordinator) for PD Field Operation.
This officer is the sorely needed direct linkage between field posts and "R", up and down. Provide that position with sufficient staff - geographic, executive, administrative - to enable that incumbent to support and coordinate PD programs initiated by the Department and the field and assist/advise "R" with her responsibilities
B. Within each regional bureau combine both PD and Public Affairs into an Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, headed by a senior PD officer.
Each office director would have a deputy for PD and a deputy for PA (with necessary staff) to handle PA requirements. Both PD director and PD deputy would participate in policy formulation and application under the direction of the regional A/S and DAS's. Concomitantly, the PD office director and PD deputy would be responsible for coordinating policy guidance with their counterparts in the new PD geographic offices, IIP and ECA.
The above reorganization recommends transferring most of the PD geographic officers from the regional bureaus and International Organizations (IO) and forming counterpart geographic offices, each under a PD office director who reports to the new A/S for PD Field Operations - (Coordinator). Those officers would in fact be "PD desk officers" and relieve regional PD officers from the many details of both field and Washington PD activities. They would provide the all-important "missing link" to the field and to "R" while providing "R" and other PD elements the geographic expertise now absent. Some senior regional PD officers, representing the regional Assistant Secretaries, would continue firmly in charge of policy issues but oversee policy implementation with the other PD components.
Comment: "Tinkering " with the present PD operations within State side-step addressing the current inadequate PD process. Making the PD officer within each regional bureau a DAS for PD is not the solution. Such evades the linkage and field support issues. To make a difference, PD must be accepted as a valuable foreign policy instrument and effect important changes to its operation in the Department as recommended. The four year experiment is chugging along, once an eight cylinder motor but now operating on four. Painting the car and placing catchy (PR) bumper stickers may seem important but essential to improving the motor (PD process) is to re-connect all of the essential spark plugs.
There are other areas within the Department requiring important PD leadership from "R" and adjustments should follow. If the Department truly wants a more effective PD operation, it must be prepared to support "R" in her responsibilities. They include PD training, PD assignments, budget control and issue guidance to the A/S for PD Field Operations - (Coordinator). The first big advance to promote more effective PD in our overseas outreach is to reconnect the PD machinery within the Department of State.
(Recently, even more harmful to an effective PD process is the current movement within State to eliminate the PD offices within each geographic bureau - mentioned earlier - and transform the PD professionals into general desk offices. This will dilute the PD process even more.)
Compiled and edited by:
Fred A. Coffey, Jr.
FSO
(Ret.)
Stan Silverman
Former
Comptroller of USIA
William Maurer,
FSO (Ret.)
Ambassador William Rugh,
FSO (Ret.)
In consultation with many professional Foreign Service (PD) Officers and former ambassadors.
Web edition: Alan
Kotok
Editor, PublicDiplomacy.Org
For the latest developments in public diplomacy see the Public Diplomacy NewsWire
See on this site the earlier discussion of public diplomacy reorganization, and
Our Crippled Public Diplomacy,
1 September 2002
We welcome comments on the Public Diplomacy Web site; send to admin@publicdiplomacy.org
This
page:
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/42.htm
Posted:
12 February 2005.
Copyright © 2003-2005. USIA Alumni Association