As noted above, based on descriptions by the mangers and staff involved, we mapped ten of IBB/VOA’s core operating and management processes: program planning and marketing; production planning; content gathering (radio); content gathering (television); operational flow (radio); operational flow (television); transmission operations; capital and information technology planning; budget formulation and execution; and personnel (especially the hiring process).

We collated the issues raised in each process into eight categories and analyzed how important each category was for each of the processes. We paid particular attention to the process for planning and marketing new programming, which has generated much internal discussion.

We found that IBB and VOA have developed highly complex operating and management processes that are not standardized and vary widely in application across the organization, and that this wide variation increases the process cycle time and level of effort required of management and staff. Coordination issues across participating units take great time and energy; the number of internal meetings and management interventions revisiting process issues is high. The absence of good metrics on costs, products, and internal support requirements limits managers’ efforts to identify and improve problem areas.

Many factors contribute to the process inefficiencies: the fragmented organizational structure, legacy processes from VOA’s traditional radio approach that do not meet the needs of today’s greater focus on customized products for specific markets (discussed later in this report), older technology, inflexibility in staff deployments that leads to bottle-necks, as well as a culture of getting the daily work out by extra effort without resolving deeper issues. There are impediments to effective and efficient performance in multiple areas:

• Coordination: Significant improvement is needed, especially in the relation of program planning, production and marketing, in the entire television effort, and in the personnel hiring process.
• Strategy and business model: The increased market focus, the shift from shortwave to FM, and the growth of television programming have dramatic consequences for the organization. Current efforts to make these changes are not clear to managers and staff, causing strains in resource utilization and notable inefficiencies in television initiatives.
• Resources: Problems in obtaining, allocating and using resources are having a major impact on the planning process, on television programming, and the hiring process.
• Process redesign: The process flow itself needs urgent attention in program planning, television content gathering and production, and hiring. Radio would also benefit from an updated workflow process.
• Skills: The organization must address how to obtain the skills it needs to produce television of the desired quality and volume. The current process of utilizing VOA radio personnel (both journalists and technicians) for television is causing inefficiencies in both media.
• Technology: The strategic shift to increase television offerings requires a significant investment in technology and support.
• Products: The choice of product types and volume heavily impacts the efficiency of radio and television.
• Transparency: The current hiring decision process can cause frustration across the organization and makes planning more difficult.

To provide an overall sense of scale of the organization and the output of its business processes, we analyzed the volume and type of programming produced and distributed.

As of September 2005, VOA produced and broadcast or distributed 832 hours of radio programming each week along with 69 hours of television programming. This was an overall increase of 14% from Fiscal Year 2000. Due to the data available, the analysis of VOA’s level of programming output is limited. VOA relies on the number of hours broadcast weekly, but this statistic may not be a fully accurate indicator of the amount of new programming produced each week.

VOA broadcasts many types of segments/programs/formats in radio and in television. The majority of radio programming is news and current affairs, using a variety of formats and lengths. Television offers a relatively even balance of news, talk and feature programs, along with numerous short news feeds. VOA’s television program types and radio formats are not standardized across divisions or services; divisions do not track or categorize their “programs” the same way.

The gaps in output data make it difficult to measure and evaluate productivity and to make valid comparisons across Language Services, Divisions and broadcasters. VOA needs better data on its programming output to assess its operational performance and its comparative productivity across units.

As we examined VOA’s outputs, we also reviewed the level of inputs used to produce them: funding, staffing and technical resources.

The total IBB operating budget for Fiscal Year 2005 was $415 million, an increase of 27% from FY 2000. Within IBB, VOA’s FY 2005 budget was $160 million (up 25% from FY 2000), while the budget for Engineering & Technical Services was $147 million (up 32%). Within VOA, Language Services were allocated 52% of the budget and grew by 22% during the same 2000-2005 period. The VOA divisions for East Asia & Pacific, West & South Asia, and Africa had significant increases, while those for Eurasia, Near East & Central Asia, and Worldwide English decreased.

In this same period, IBB staff levels declined from 2,350 to 2,152. The staff of VOA and of Engineering & Technical Services each were reduced by 98 FTE (full-time equivalents), to reach 1,190 and 645 respectively in 2005. During this period, the use of contractors has increased significantly both for VOA and for IBB overall. Data on the number of contractor labor hours or the breakdown by language service were unavailable.

VOA averages roughly 1 hour of broadcast per staff FTE, with individual services ranging from 4.55 hours per FTE to .58. These ratios exclude contractor hours, which are significant in some services and would alter their labor productivity figures.

The government employees of IBB (including VOA) and the BBG direct support staff have a long average tenure, with 33% having more than 20 years of government service.

Much of VOA’s radio and television production equipment is older than the broadcast industry’s standard lifecycle of 7 years. Analysis of the VOA’s September 2005 inventory showed that 28% of radio equipment was more than 10 years old, as was 36% of television equipment. The older equipment has less technical capability than more recent technology and requires greater maintenance over time.

We concluded that the emerging emphasis on television will have a significant impact on IBB/VOA resource requirements. Television production costs far more than radio on a per minute basis. According to VOA’s own count in January 2006, more than twenty of its language services were pursuing television production initiatives. Even if only some of these go forward soon, the development of a robust television capability will require substantial investment -- for studios, equipment, and staff -- over and above the recent levels of budget growth.

We also concluded that the current staffing approach may not be sustainable. To a growing extent in recent years, IBB/VOA management has brought in new editorial and production talent as individual contractors. This approach has proven faster and more flexible than the existing hiring process, allowing the organization to address some of its changing personnel needs more quickly. At the same time, it has increased some training needs, created scheduling issues, and generated internal morale issues. The management of contractors currently is handled within each unit, and opportunities for sharing resources are missed. A more flexible human capital system, especially for television, would improve overall effectiveness and efficiency.

Our research into the practices of other public and private organizations, especially multi-media broadcasters, focused on their structure and the distribution of functions and responsibilities in three areas:

• The operating units compared with the "corporate core;"
• Multi-media programming and production units; and
• Marketing and programming. While the way these functions and responsibilities are managed in other organizations vary, we found some leading practices for BBG to consider.

First, among a number of leading international multi-media organizations, we found that the central corporate level focuses on overall strategy, corporate brand, financial oversight and control, and shareholder/stakeholder relations. Depending on corporate philosophy, size and asset diversity, the corporate core has varying degrees of involvement in the strategies of the individual business units. However, the business units usually have authority to make decisions and execute strategy, control key resources, and are accountable for their performance.

At present, neither IBB nor VOA is structured or operates as a full business unit, with responsibility and accountability for resources and performance. We concluded that restructuring functions, decision rights, and accountability from elements of IBB and VOA into a single “natural” business unit could improve organizational performance.

Second, the commercial and public broadcasters we researched have established separate units for their radio, television and “new media” programming/production. Within their television business units, the subunits are organized by format type (e.g. breaking news vs. magazine shows) and program. In organizations that produce “breaking news” or “top stories” programs, there is often a shared news gathering operation, focused on producing television pieces, with the audio or script used for radio. VOA’s practice of combined radio and television operational units aligned by language is very uncommon, as is its practice of finding video tape to match its produced radio pieces for television use. There are significant inefficiencies created by the attempt to build a robust television capability principally by sharing or re-training radio editorial and production staff. The current Internet effort is small and in an early stage of development.

We concluded that creating separate units by medium may improve productivity and efficiency.

Third, in most multi-media organizations --- both commercial and public-- the marketing and programming functions are structured as separate sub-units reporting to a common manager who is responsible for the performance of the common business unit. There is often some tension between these functions, particularly around program development, that must be actively managed.

Although the VOA and the Office of Marketing and Program Placement are formally structured as parallel divisions within the common IBB structure, they are in practice far less integrated than in comparable organizations. We concluded that more connection between them, within a stronger single business unit structure with shared goals and performance metrics, could contribute to improved coordination and performance. Strategic Direction and Business Models The BBG oversees a system that operates in a constantly changing environment, including the global political situation, emerging technologies, and a rapidly evolving media environment with greater competition for audience attention. The BBG’s 2002 document, “Marrying the Mission to the Market,” issued in 2002, put forward a strategic vision to respond to the challenges.

This vision included ways in which IBB/VOA would change, including wider use of FM and television relative to shortwave in many markets, a focus on programming that was more tailored to audiences in prioritized target markets, and a greater reliance of program distribution through local stations as compared with direct broadcast. These changes framed a new business model for IBB/VOA that differs significantly from its traditional approach.

In VOA’s traditional business model, the central operation gathers and writes most news stories and produces features, then the multiple language services translate and record them, supplementing them with some language-specific content, and then broadcasting directly, predominantly by shortwave radio.

The new business model increases the customization of the news content dramatically, and encourages each service to gather stories of interest to its own target audience, relying on the central operation for fewer stories. In many markets, programs are distributed through affiliated local FM or television stations. The affiliates have some feedback and influence on the range of subjects covered, schedules and formats. Each of these models has strengths and weaknesses and may be appropriate for certain markets and circumstances. We found both models in use at VOA, but the managers and staff were unclear about when and how they are to utilize each model. The change in emphasis and methods remains controversial among managers and staff. Further, the internal shift in resources and the development of capabilities that the new model requires have not been fully implemented.

We concluded that a more detailed plan is needed to identify the priorities, milestones, capabilities and roles/responsibilities of units under the new model, and how to balance the different approaches needed to reach different audiences and markets.