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Much of the world today views the United States negatively,
considering it dangerous and unpredictable. Recent polling
overseas confirms the continuation of the downward slide in
global public opinion that gathered force with the 2000 U.S.
elections and accelerated sharply in 2003 with the invasion of
Iraq.
Current approaches to building support for U.S. policies
and American values, from the State Department's worldwide
public diplomacy to the Defense Department's public affairs
activities in war zones, have failed to reverse negative attitudes
so severe that they thwart the United States' ability to achieve
its foreign policy objectives. Anti-American forces are taking
advantage of the collapse of U.S. popularity across the globe,
making anti-Americanism a national security threat.
The U.S. government should take a series of immediate
steps to regain American credibility overseas. The Bush
administration must revise some of its signature policies and
moderate its style of international discourse in order to regain
the goodwill the United States previously earned. Much more
emphasis on public diplomacy is essential. Additionally, Congress
and the executive branch should use the next two years to
restructure the apparatus of governmental soft power instruments,
making them more effective and powerful.
The Pew Research Center's June 2006
Global Attitudes Project demonstrates
what other polls have been saying in
recent years: world public opinion has
turned ferociously against the United
States. Favorable opinion has plummeted
in nearly all countries surveyed in
Europe, Asia, and especially the Middle
East. The United States has never been as
unpopular in Western Europe. Even in
the United Kingdom 41 percent of those
polled think the United States is a greater
threat to world peace than Iran. Most
countries polled now view China more
favorably than the United States. In
Turkey, a NATO ally country, only 12
percent of those polled have a favorable
opinion of the United States -- down from
52 percent in 2000. In Indonesia
favorable opinion declined from 75 percent
in 2000 to 15 percent in 2003, and
it has risen to 30 percent today chiefly
because of our tsunami assistance. In
not a single majority-Muslim population
country polled in 2002 did a majority
believe that Arabs carried out the 9/11
attacks; these same majorities support
Osama bin Laden and evince sympathy
for suicide bombers.
Across the globe people believe that
the Iraq war makes the world more dangerous,
and this perception undercuts
support for the overall war on terrorism.
American actions at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo,
and Haditha combine with U.S.
renditions, defense of torture, and violations
of the Geneva Conventions to
blacken the U.S. image. In the past, when
foreign attitudes faulted the U.S. government,
the American people still
enjoyed favorable ratings, but this has
been changing: between 2002 and 2005
favorability ratings of Americans fell in
nine of twelve countries polled. As
Roger Cohen memorably put it, the
world has "stopped buying the American
narrative."
A catalogue of further complaints
completes the picture. World opinion
faults the Bush administration for its
unilateralism and preemption,
unflinching support of Israel, and scorn
for international organizations. The
Bush administration's decision to withdraw
from the Kyoto Protocol and its
dismissal of the threat of global warming
have been met with dismay by key Asian
and European allies. Additional irritants
include stingy assistance to the world's
poor in comparison with other wealthy
countries and the slow and ineffective
response to Katrina, which made the
U.S. government appear less generous
and even-handed than America claims to
be....
From 1953 until its merger with the State
Department in 1999, the United States
Information Agency (USIA) conducted
most of U.S. public diplomacy and
amplified its soft power. Although never
perfect, USIA earned a creditable record
"telling America's story to the world"
through a hard-won alliance of broadcasting,
cultural, educational, information,
and advocacy programs. USIA, with
more overseas posts than any other U.S.
government agency, was the largest public
diplomacy operation of any nation
ever, as well as the world's largest publisher
and a formidable broadcaster. A
recent analysis sharply contrasts USIA's
effective performance during the first
Gulf War with public diplomacy's current
failures.
The decline began in the early
1990s when the executive and legislative
branches decided that Cold War-era
funding levels for public diplomacy were
unnecessary and USIA suffered severe
cutbacks and eventual elimination. The
broadcasting function was peeled off and
consolidated with other non-military
U.S. government overseas broadcasters
under the autonomous Broadcasting
Board of Governors. The public diplomacy
function has not fared well in the
traditionalist State Department culture,
nor has broadcasting prospered under its
new umbrella.
A flood of studies in the last few years
broadly concludes that public diplomacy's ills since the merger include serious
deficiencies in strategic planning and in
coordinating activities across the government,
within the State Department, and
between State and U.S. embassies.
However, the persistent inadequacy of
personnel and program resources to sustain
basic outreach overseas remains the
most serious problem. Congress allots
approximately $630 million to State
Department public diplomacy and $645
million to non-military broadcasting,
which together total approximately 4
percent of State's overall international
affairs budget and 0.6 percent of the
Pentagon's budget. To put these numbers
into context, the United States
spends the same amount on public
diplomacy as Britain or France, despite
the fact that it is five times bigger than
either and has much more serious credibility
problems. If the United States
were to spend as much per person on
public diplomacy in the Muslim world as
it did in Germany and Japan after World
War II, the budget for these countries
would be $7 billion. The number of
U.S. public diplomacy officers, which
reached 2,500 in 1991, has since been
cut in half, with technology replacing
much of their personal contact work
overseas....
Several steps by the U.S. government,
combined with more vigorous support
from the American public, can begin to
reverse the damage to the U.S. image
overseas. Karen Hughes's most pressing
task is to persuade the president of the
need for rebuilding credibility, an effort
that will fail without his buy-in.
Shifts in policy, the prime factor in
forming public opinion, are the first
priority. The Bush administration's
marginal retreats from its first-term doctrines
of preemption and unilateralism
have failed to mollify our critics or nullify
the threat anti-Americanism poses to
U.S. security. Consequently, further
U.S. work within international institutions,
treaties, and alliances will be helpful,
along with conspicuous fair play in
trade relations. The U.S. government
must take responsibility for mistakes it
has made, punish those at fault, and
move to rectify the consequences. Reviving
the U.S. role as honest broker
between the Israelis and the Palestinians
is also crucial. Ultimately, the U.S. government
will bolster its image abroad by
treating other nations with renewed
respect; listening to world opinion; and
matching policy more consistently with
American ideals and values such as fairness,
the rule of law, human rights,
opportunity, and humility.
To address the next priority, rebuilding
soft power, the U.S. government
should re-establish its good global citizenship
by deploying American knowhow
to solve global problems: fighting
poverty, disease, tyranny, and environmental
degradation as well as terrorism.
Even where the United States finds few
friends, American science, technology,
medicine, and education earn respect
and provide an entrée for expanded
hands-on programs. In the Muslim
world education of the very young is critical,
given the depth of suspicion and
misunderstanding. Enhanced foreign
assistance should be tailored to local
milieux in order to leverage shared principles
and help countries transform
themselves rather than expecting them to
transform in the U.S. image. People-to-people
programs excel, demonstrating
American diversity, generosity, and talent
and exploding the deadly myths circulating
about the United States, especially
among people lacking personal
experience with Americans.
As its third priority, the U.S. government must
combat anti-Americanism with as much
energy and capital as it dedicated to winning
hearts and minds during the Cold
War. During that time the United States
funded 50,000 Soviets -- and many more
from Warsaw Pact countries -- to come
here on exchange programs, which
together with American broadcasting
helped win the ideological battle. Given
the Islamic world's estimated population
of 1.2 billion, the United States should
start building relationships with
200,000 Muslim students, professors,
teachers, journalists, political activists,
and other influential people, not handfuls
here and there as at present. Public
diplomacy, consequently, needs more
funding immediately, at least ten times
the amount now allocated....
While these difficult, urgent
steps are taken to halt the damage to
American credibility, structural changes
should be initiated so that the next president
can rebuild soft power on a more
stable foundation. The State Department
should retain the policy advocacy and
information functions of public diplomacy,
which should be married with the
policy formation process, but public
diplomacy's long-term relationship
building or "mutual understanding"
programs should be divested from State.
These activities -- academic and cultural
exchange programs, speakers, and
libraries -- would benefit from joining the
U.S. government's other soft power
efforts under the umbrella of a bipartisan
supervisory board, thus forming a
Smithsonian-like institution for outreach
to overseas publics -- the "Public
Diplomacy Institute."
A grouping of the State Department's
exchange programs, the Peace Corps, the
Agency for International Development,
the National Endowment for Democracy,
the U.S. Institute for Peace, and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors would
enable these activities to network with
each other and NGO and private-sector
partners at home and abroad. This
bundling would greatly increase the clout
of soft power work in Washington. The
Institute should also coordinate with the
soft power efforts of the Defense Department,
the National Science Foundation,
and other agencies....
The full text of the article is found on the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Web site.
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