Remarks prepared for the United States Information Agency Alumni Association, 30 March 2007, Washington, DC

The genesis of the Department of Homeland Security is the horrific attack on the World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001 or simply 9/11. In the wake of the shock caused by this terrorist disaster, public opinion, the Congress and the President were moved to re-organize the national security establishment of the United States. Since the end of Cold War, ten years before this catastrophic event, there had been no major attempt to 're-tool' the security agencies to reflect the increasingly asymmetrical threats. This was in sharp contrast to the reorganization and redefinition undergone by the US military, intelligence and foreign policy institutions after World War II in order to meet the emerging Soviet challenge.

The principal effort the National Security Act of 1947 was the legislation that created the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. Ultimately, these were the key factors in the evolving 'Containment Policy' as Soviet Communism became the defining force of US foreign policy for the following forty years. When the Soviet Union crumbled in the early 1990's, the US emerged as the only remaining 'super power'. Yet, we did not count with a national security vision that addressed post-Cold War non-conventional threats nor engaged the American public. In sum, no compelling threat assessment resulted in any meaningful change or modification of the national strategic and tactical preparedness until the events that took place on 9/11.

The mere mention of 'change' within a bureaucracy normally produces the unleashing of anti-bodies. DHS was no exception.

In 2002 Congress passed legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its mission was to 'detect, prevent, respond and recover from any natural or man- made (terrorist) disaster'. This legislative mandate required the reorganization and amalgamation of twenty-two existing executive agencies with over 180,000 personnel. These agencies included the now major components of DHS: the Secret Service, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), FEMA, Citizenship and Immigration (CIS) and the newly created Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Except for FEMA and CIS, the rest are mainly law enforcement agencies. A new DHS structure was super-imposed on the following components, which include the Office of the Secretary, the General Counsel, the Under Secretary for Management, the Policy Directorate, the Preparedness Division, Information Analysis and the Science and Technology Directorate. For the first two years, The Office of International Affairs (OIA) was placed within the Office of the Secretary. After a “Second Stage Review” (2SR) in 2005 it was elevated from an Office Directorate to an Assistant Secretary bureau along with several other offices.

Plainly, the most recurring and daunting challenge in these early years has been 'managing change'. The mere mention of 'change' within a bureaucracy normally produces the unleashing of anti-bodies. DHS was no exception. Consequently, the effort to bring together all these disparate agencies under one tent was often Sisyphean. Moreover, here I should note the imbalance of the Federal Bureaucracy's three P's: Process, Policy and Personality. The first two were initially scarce at DHS. The third, Personality, was the dominant driver in this newly created bureaucratic structure during these early formative years. Governor Tom Ridge's political stature, command presence and soothing demeanor guided the Department through the bureaucratic and political thickets of Washington. Ridge was truly the glue that held it together. He was fond of saying that 'working at DHS was like building an aircraft while flying it'. Unlike the established bureaucracies found at the State Department, Treasury, Justice and Defense; which are suffused with process and policy-making, DHS readily came across as fledgling and lacking the structured role expected in Washington circles. When Secretary Chertoff arrived, he readily grasped the deficiency in not having a departmental policy and planning office. He ordered a review (Second Stage Review) of the current DHS headquarters structure which helped institute more efficient process and policy-making discussion.

Border security, a staggering task
DHS has multiple tasks and responsibilities. Most prominent among them is border security. Implicit in this undertaking is achieving the correct balance in the cross-border flow of goods, services and people. Clearly, safeguarding international trade is vital to the American economy. The growing security threats experienced by our country have forced the agencies involved to become innovative in managing risk while maintaining a desired flow of world trade. DHS has this responsibility at all of the nation's seaports, international airports and land ports of entry while securing the borders. The magnitude of the task is staggering: securing 5,500 miles of land border with Canada and nearly two thousand miles with Mexico; annually processing over 400 million people entries; and checking over 120 million vehicles entering the US yearly; as well as, nearly nine million maritime containers; plus examining air cargo at over 150 international airports; and safeguarding over 92,000 miles of navigable waterways.

Clearly, border security presents enormous international challenges. Partnering with foreign countries has become a necessity. DHS' posting abroad of over 1500 personnel is in the forefront of this effort. Moreover, in forging partnerships innovative initiatives formalize these cooperative relationships. After 9/11 and before DHS was functional, US Customs (now CBP) formulated and implemented a most effective and successful program: CSI. This Container Security Initiative began in 2002 almost simultaneously in Rotterdam and Singapore. It was a formal agreement negotiated bi- laterally with each country. The EU quickly complained that such bilateral agreements were distorting trade by one port becoming more attractive to shipping over other ports not in the CSI arrangement. US Customs moved swiftly to dispel this assertion by rapidly reaching agreement with several other EU countries ( ports).

The CSI program's goal is to inspect or vet every maritime container (annually about 9 million) entering the US. It requires CBP to deploy personnel under bilateral agreement to the sending port ( Rotterdam) and conversely the foreign government has the right to post personnel to the US. In sum, the CSI process together with other initiatives, like the Department of Energy's Megaports program designed to detect fissile material, seeks to collect prior to to arrival, all information concerning each maritime container being shipped to the US. This information includes not only the specific contents, but also the identities of the producer/manufacturer, the packers, the transporters to port, the port terminal handlers, the shipping line, the vessel's crew, the receiving port terminal operators, rail and truck shippers and the designated recipient. CBP's National Targeting Center evaluates the information and assigns a 'risk' grade assessment to each container. If it is determined that a container merits further examination by scanning and/or physical inspection (i.e. emptying contents) the Targeting Center notifies its personnel on the ground.

Approximately, 2% to 5% of all containers entering US ports, undergo 'secondary' inspection. If a significantly greater number of containers were suddenly to undergo such examination, port ship movement would ultimately slow down and adversely affect the economies of both sending and receiving countries. CSI is certainly a risk management proposition designed to address the security concerns, as well as, be mindful of the economic needs.

Other DHS initiatives designated to facilitate trade and the movement of people at ports of entry include: US Visit, a program based on the biometric reading of travel documents such as passports and US visas. This has been a success at entry ports but, the almost non-existent exit process renders it an incomplete program. The discussion of biometric use with the international community has been primarily conducted through the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). It has been largely productive. Official consensus on digital photograph in travel documents has been adapted. The US remains committed to obtaining an international consensus on a secondary biometric, such as digital fingerprints. Voice recognition and the scanning of the iris are two other biometric options discussed. Fingerprints are advocated vigorously because no criminal or terrorist ever leaves an imprint of the face, voice or iris at the scene of the crime.

Nonetheless, culturally, some countries are reluctant to demand fingerprinting because of its 'criminal procedure' connotation. Another international sensitive discussion is the one that deals with 'privacy issues'. Several countries, especially the EU, have concerns about the treatment of personal information. This includes agreement on data points such as dietary habits, religious beliefs and other personal characteristics. The length of storage of the data has also been a point of contention, especially in the Personal Name Registration (PNR) program. The upshot has turned out to be closer institutional relations or partnerships with foreign governments on the exchange and handling of police and immigration information, as well as other sensitive intelligence. DHS' Information Analysis Office (IA) is at the forefront of these efforts.

International partnerships have helped enormously to neutralize terrorist plans against the US.

As I mentioned before, there are over 1500 DHS personnel are stationed abroad. Nearly a third (450) are based in Canada in CBP's pre-clearance program. The remaining number (over 1,000) are primarily ICE, CIS, TSA, Coast Guard and Secret Service. FEMA has two officers posted to USNATO in Brussels. The others work with host governments on immigration and customs criminal investigations (ICE), aviation and transport security (TSA), ship and port security (Coast Guard), international credit fraud and counterfeiting (USSS), CSI, customs quotas and tariffs (CBP), and servicing US citizens and their beneficiaries abroad on citizenship benefits (CIS). DHS headquarters' Information and Analysis (IA) as part of the intelligence community (IC) has the lead on expanding international information partnering.. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate has an international office that has actively negotiated S&T agreements with the UK, Canada, Singapore, Australia and engaged with others in reaching agreement.

Law enforcement: intrinsically tactical
The exchange of technology and best practices in research, development and implementation has been the focus of S&T. The DHS Office of International Affairs has stood up bi-lateral working groups with the UK, Spain, Russia, Sweden, Israel and is actively pursuing engagement with the Middle East and Africa. It also manages the US-Mexico Dialogue through the existing Bi-national Commission. Partnership discussions with Holland, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia are also conducted by OIA. The US-Canada homeland discussions are conducted through the long established cross- border institutions like Customs Canada with CBP and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to ICE and the Secret Service.

It should be noted that DHS is largely a law enforcement department. And law enforcement is intrinsically tactical (case by case approach to problem solving). It is generally not strategic in outlook or approach. On the international side the OIA 's challenge has been to formulate a strategic context to this tactical orientation. This requires closer DHS coordination with the Defense Department, State Department, the Intelligence Community and the Justice Department, as well as, the White House, Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council. Many foreign governments observe that DHS is not a traditional 'interior ministry'. Moreover, it is not 'offensive' in structure; it is largely 'defensive'. In other words, DHS does not have the offensive capability to go abroad and root out a terrorist group. Critics of DHS have remarked that this newly created department is a 'Maginot Line' that terrorist will game and strike. Perhaps there is some validity to this but, the fact remains that for nearly six years no terrorist act has occurred within the United States. Certainly, the DHS efforts in detection and prevention have demonstrated some merit . Indeed the UK, Spain, Russia, Indonesia, and the Middle East have experienced terrorist activities during this period. International partnerships have helped enormously to neutralize terrorist plans against the US. Lastly, the 'retooling' of Homeland Security's assets by reorganization and the creation of a new department has contributed significantly to this deterrence. .

During the Hurricane Katrina crisis an international challenge arose when many foreign governments began to offer relief assistance like food stuffs, physicians, rescue workers, search and rescue aircraft, medicines and other supplies. The US plainly was not prepared nor ever seriously contemplated this scenario. Foreign medical workers without licenses, medicines without FDA approval, food ruled unacceptable by the USDA because it originated in 'Madcow' areas, all presented health hazards and legal liability issues. FEMA along with the State Department, USAID, and the Red Cross formed a working group to handle the problem. Several foreign governments complained that their assistance was not welcomed or acceptable. In fact, much of the assistance sat idly at airports, some of it like medicines and food deteriorated. It was readily determined that monetary contributions was the only practical way to minimize the liability hurdles. The perceived leadership insufficiency at the time of the Katrina crisis should not suggest that DHS failed: it simply concentrated on preparedness for a terrorist attack not for a natural disaster of the magnitude of Katrina.

Certainly, the above discussion presents a smattering of DHS' international activities. The conclusion that can be made is that the international dimension will continue to expand. Safeguarding the borders requires closely knitted partnerships with foreign governments.

Cresencio Arcos is a former officer at USIA and State Department, U.S. ambassador to Honduras (1989-93), and since October 2006, serves as Government Affairs Counselor at the law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP (K&L Gates). At K&L Gates, he provides guidance to the firm's clients on homeland security issues, foreign policy and international telecommunications.

In 2005 Amb. Arcos became assistant secretary for international affairs at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after having served as DHS director for international affairs since 2003. He was the principal advisor to the secretary and other senior DHS officials on all homeland security matters relating to U.S. foreign policy.